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 This paper aims at proposing a new insight into the context of construction 
management from the Promise Theory point of view. The theory advocates decentralization 
and forming a network of localized components, connected to each other in a chain of 
promises. Such method has been examined in configuration management systems, knowledge 
management and virtual organizations, with reportedly successful results. There are also 
footprints of such pattern in agile practices, especially in SCRUM method. However, little, if 
any, research has applied such a pattern in lean construction methods. Promise Theory point 
of view helps in a better understanding of how the agents can be separated, while linked in a 
self-organized manner in the context of lean methods in general and the Last Planner System 
in particular. 
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1. Introduction 
The main principle of lean methods is reducing wastes via reinforcing quality 
assignments and reliability of promises (Hamzeh, 2009). The Last Planner System (LPS), as a 
lean construction method, is not an exception. The significant difference between lean 
methods and traditional project planning methods, e.g. CPM, is that in the former, the actors, 
i.e. the “last planners” in the LPS are participated in decision making, whereas in the latter 
decisions are made in a centralized manner, often far from the settings in which the actions 
take place, both in terms of distance and time.  
By the same token, agile strategies focus on thriving in unpredictable environments, e.g. 
IT management. In other words, to be agile, an enterprise or project must be structured 
appropriately to proactively and quickly adapt to change, seizing such opportunities to 
enhance value outcomes(Owen, Koskela, Henrich, & Codinhoto, 2006). SCRUM, as an agile 
method, has provided a new insight into managing highly variable and unpredictable 
environments (Kniberg & Skarin, 2010). 
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There are slight differences between LPS and SCRUM, in terms of leadership style. In 
fact, the former follows a sort of consultative-autocrat leadership style, that is the project 
leader absorbs the information input from the team members, though makes the ultimate 
decision (Odusami, Iyagba, & Omirin, 2003), whereas the latter relies on a flatter, 
self-managing, team-based structure rather than close, hierarchical management. In this sense, 
the scrum master is very much seen as a facilitator who tracks the progress of the team, 
allows them to make commitments to each other (Cervone, 2011), enables small, 
self-organizing teams to decide for themselves how they satisfy their value goals(Owen et al., 
2006). The removal of tiered management effectively removes communications overhead, as 
well as minimizing system noises (Bonabeau & Meyer, 2001). This can be regarded as a 
paradigm shift in project management practices, since most project managers opt for 
following a well-prepared plan and the ensuing fight to get back on the plan when things go 
wrong. Adapting agile methods to construction management context requires significant 
changes in infrastructures and internal systems, especially in large organizations. 
(Burgess, 2015b) proposes a novel viewpoint, Promise Theory (PT), in order to model 
the relationship between agents in decentralized decision-making systems. This paper argues 
that with a change in the point of view, construction managers could take the advantage of 
self-managing, though scalable teams. To this end, the PT and the underpinning theories and 
approaches are discussed. 
2. Promise Theory 
In philosophy, a promise is defined as a concept related to morality (Sheinman, 2011). In 
business, promises are not only about morality as imposed onto the promisor, but also contain 
valuable information for management of expectations. In this context, PT is regarded as a 
model of cooperation between autonomous agents, i.e. promisors and promises, who publish 
their intentions to one another in the form of promises (Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006). 
Carrillo and Dewatripont (Carrillo & Dewatripont, 2008) discussed that a promise can 
increase the likelihood of voluntary cooperation.  
PT defines the promise as a scoped, documented intention that is exposed to another 
agent. It argues that a set of intentions is much more manageable than actions. In this sense, 
predictions and decisions are made based on the documented intentions each agent exposes to 
another. To this end, the conflict of intentions could be detected and resolved before turning 
into real issues. The theory emphasizes the following principles: 
? Locality: avoid impositions, keep things close, and stay responsible. 
? Reciprocity: nurture a repeated relationship, think of what drives the economic motor 
of agent relationships. 
? Deal with uncertainties: have multiple contingencies for keeping promises. What will 
an agent do if a promise it relies on is not kept? 
Fig. 1 shows how a promise flows throughout the agents. Agent A2 promises P (note the 
plus sign), with a promise body consisting of What, Where, When, and How (3W+H), to the 
agent A1. The agent A1 accepts (the negative sign denotes the acceptance) the promise with 





Fig. 1. The relation between agents in view of PT 
 
Although the footprint of PT is meager in the context of management, it has been finding 
its way into the management arena in recent years. Burgess has introduced new insights into 
the field of knowledge management (Burgess, 2009). Shadi et al. (Shadi, Afsarmanesh, & 
Dastani, 2013) proposed a framework based on PT to model and monitor the behavior of 
agents in virtual organizations.  
This research argues that the construction management context has come a long way 
from the command-control methods (e.g. CPM) to the pull methods (e.g. the LPS); the way is 
paved for a little more shift in viewpoint with a tendency to make construction environments 
even more collaborative and self-organized. The PT is likely the lever.  
2.1. PT in construction 
In traditional construction management methods (e.g. CPM), an 
obligation-/command-control (OCC) model was prevalent. Planning was done 
somewhere/sometime far from where/when the actions occurred. In this context, it is not 
surprising that construction practices deal with unpredicted situations that become 
increasingly unmanageable, leading to schedule pressure, erroneous outcomes, delays, and 
budget overruns. In addition, when the number of agents gets large, scalability would be a 
serious challenge in the case of imperative scripting and remote execution. 
In recent years, lean methods revealed that project planning is not as easy as providing a 
CPM or Gantt chart. Construction projects, due to their complex nature and multiple layers of 
abstractions, require a novel approach for planning. Contrary to the traditional methods, the 
LPS suggests (1) approaching the planning to the implementation (in terms of time and space); 
(2) providing the team members with the opportunity to participate in decision making and 
planning processes.  
In view of PT, the LPS upgrades the construction planning conventions via a number of 
drivers discussed in section 3. As shown in Fig. 2a, in OCC models, the commands often 
diverge from one person, i.e. usually the in-charge of the team (e.g. superintendent) to the 








(a) (b)  
Fig. 2. Task assignment in view of (a) OCC; (b) PT 
 
This paper argues that, at the team level, the LPS follows neither OCC nor PT. It lies 
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somewhere in between. The manager puts much effort to document the actions in the LPS 
board (Fig. 3) and assign the tasks to subordinates. Although it is a step forward, in the PT 










Fig. 3. The LPS board 
 
To be more explicit about how the intentions are documented in the PT model, the 
following example explicates a scenario of pouring concrete in foundation F1. In this scenario, 
there are three agents: A1 (superintendent), A2 (concrete worker) and A3 (iron worker) and 
two promises P1 (pouring concrete) and P2 (reinforcement). The body of each promise is 
shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. the body of promises 
Promise Promisor Promise What Where When 
P1 A2 A1 poured-in concrete F1 Tuesday 
P2 A3 A2 reinforced foundation F1 Thursday 
 
According to Table 1 and Fig. 2b, the flow of promises is as follows: 
1. The iron worker promises a reinforced F1 by Tuesday to the concrete worker (+P2).  
2. The concrete worker accepts the iron worker’s promise (-P2).  
3. The concrete worker promises a poured-in, smoothed-over concrete by Thursday to 
the superintendent if the iron worker keeps his promise (+P1|P2).  
4. The superintendent accepts the concrete worker’s promise (-P1) 
2.2. LPS in view of PT 
At the weekly work plan level, task assignment procedure of the LPS can be justified in 
a PT way as follows: 
1. In weekly meetings, the manager distinguishes the workable tasks, enlists them in 
“Workable Backlog”.  
2. The team members, intend to perform the tasks they can do based on their KSA (i.e. 
Knowledge, Skills, Abilities) 
3. Intentions are documented. 
4. The conditional intentions are identified and the promise network is formed and 
documented. 
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5. Cooperations are formed once the promises are accepted by the promises. 
3. PT Drivers 
Despite the wealth of recent works on the examination and applications of the LPS in 
construction project management, little work, if any, has studied the method from the PT 
point of view. The authors argue that digging into the intricate network of promises, intentions 
and the agents, helps to better understand and develop the principle of the LPS in particular 
and pull methods in general. For this, the following attempts to provide an insight into the 
drivers through which PT can empower LPS to make more difference via decentralization and 
mapping the set of workable backlogs to a chain of promises. 
3.1. Dunbar’s limit 
(Dunbar, 1992) suggested that there is a cognitive limit to the number of people with 
whom one can maintain stable social relationships—relationships in which an individual 
knows who each person is relates to every other person. Moreover, the more intimate 
relationships, the fewer we can maintain. In this sense, any strategy to reduce the number of 
connections and/or degrade the quality of connections would be of benefit to the manager. PT, 
advocates the flow of promises throughout a chain of agents rather than a divergent model of 
commands handed out by the manager. This shifts the effort from the unnecessary, delegable 
promises to the most critical ones. 
3.2. Working memory 
Working memory commonly refers to the cognitive process that enables individuals to 
maintain and process a limited amount of information at a time (Baddeley, 1992, 1998). 
Working memory plays a key role in occupational functioning. Although working memory 
can be rehearsed, it is limited (Cowan, 2010; Hogarth, 1987). The limitation does not allow us 
to link and process more than 3-5 issues at a time. To this end, delegating promises to 
subordinates frees up some slots (chunks) of memory for more substantial works. 
3.3. Locality 
In the conventional pull methods, from PT point of view, the team manager plays the 
role of a promise dealer. This violates a principle of PT, locality. According to locality, the 
greater the distance from the point of promise-making, the less causal responsibility an agent 
has in contributing to the outcome. Simply put, a promise, together with the necessary 
know-hows to assess and keep the promise, is preferably meant to be entirely localized in a 
single agent, so all the information required to discover inconsistencies, arising from 
conflicting promises, is automatically located in one place. In this sense, each agent is, by 
design, capable of resolving its own inconsistencies without any external help. This is a huge 
step forward for individual certainty (Burgess, 2015a). 
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3.4. Bounded rationality 
Individuals’ rationality in decision making is limited by the tractability of the decision 
problem, the cognitive limitations of their minds, and the time available to make the 
decision(Simon, 1972). Putting the PT together with game theoretic models in general and 
Nash’s equilibrium model in particular, as well as the social exchange theory, reveals that 
cooperation is likely have explanations rooted in bounded rationality: Why should I keep my 
promises? What will I get out of it? The PT has the prospects to open new insights into 
modeling and understanding the relation between these themes. 
3.5 Scalability 
(Tainter, 1988) stated that as groups grow, tendencies would show up as specializing into 
different roles in order to scale up. However, separation comes at a cost: to get a service from 
a specialist, it is inevitable to reconnect with them. As agencies separate, they often form their 
own private languages that are not equilibrated with the general population, so there is a 
language barrier cost as well; bureaucracy and organizational silos get into the game. 
Eventually, due to the degradations in trusts, the cost of reconnecting through barriers will 
raise. 
To this end, PT encourages decentralizing the flow of promises throughout the agents (i.e. 
specialists) that promise to know how to do their job. Decentralization in this manner, eases 
the bottlenecks that limit the enlargement. Decentralized, flat organizations exhibit scalability 
with less effort compared to the conventional hierarchical structures(Burgess, 2015b). The 
flourishing startups are the evidence for such statement. Google, as well, has shown 
tendencies and even movements towards flat organization structure. 
3.6 Self-Determination Theory (SDT) 
PT and SDT are both advocate of autonomy. Autonomy is, on the one hand, a 
presumption of the PT with the notion that “no agent can force any other agent to accept or 
transmit information, alter its state, or change its behavior. Also no agent may make a promise 
on behalf of any other”(Burgess, 2005, 2015b). On the other hand, autonomy is a human need 
from the SDT (Ryan & Deci, 2000).  
PT, via encouraging to document the intentions rather than the actions, attempts to 
formulate outcomes by destination rather than getting deep into processes. In view of the SDT, 
this promotes the sense of autonomy and motivation among the agents. 
4. Conclusions  
This paper encourages a new insight into the LPS task assignment procedure from the PT 
point of view. In this view, decentralization is encouraged in order to promote the scalability 
and manageability of the team in a self-organized manner. In this sense, the team manager is 
more of a SCRUM master than of a CPM commander. Such a context has been examined in 
agile techniques, e.g. SCRUM, with reportedly successful outcomes.  
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However, applying such a viewpoint to construction management would not seem that 
easy. An issue that is expected to raise is that “Why they should keep their promises while 
there is no coercion?”. Elaborate incentive mechanisms are deemed as helpful and necessary 
in motivating the individuals to keep their promises. The incentives could be contingent on 
the importance, urgency and the effort needed to keep the promise.   
Moreover, establishing such a culture requires top managers to understand the full 
context of PT and create awareness about the principles of the theory in their subordinates.  
Design management, due to the similarity to the IT context, seems promising as a start 
point for such a change.  
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